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Abstract 
Citizens’ attitudes and reactions to policymakers’ decisions depend on several factors, 
including informal institutions. The novelty of this paper is to use social capital as a 
moderator factor to shed light on the relationship between fiscal policies and electoral 
outcomes. We investigate this relationship using a sample of 6,000 Italian municipalities over 
the period 2003-2012 and use a Conditional Logit Matching model comparing incumbents to 
challengers’ characteristics within each election. We find that social capital increases the 
odds of the re-election of incumbent mayors who adopted a local fiscal policy more oriented 
towards capital investment (versus current expenditure) and towards property tax (versus 
income surcharge). This suggests that social capital encourages governmental functions and 
public policies improving long-term economic commitments, institutional transparency, and 
accountability. It also shows that decentralization works relatively better with social capital. 
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The new institutional economics literature has been stressing the role of informal institutions 
in affecting citizens’ preferences and shaping their attitudes and reaction to policymakers’ 
decisions (Chong and Gradstein, 2006; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Sabatini, 2008; 
Guven, 2011). Inspired by this research perspective, and to the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to analyze the role of social capital in moderating the relational dynamics occurring 
between local government’s fiscal decisions and subsequent electoral outcomes.  Social 
capital commonly refers to elements of cooperation, reciprocity and mutual trust regulating 
the relations among the members of a community and of a social network (Christoforou 
2010). This enables citizens to cooperate for the mutual benefit, reduces asymmetric 
information problems, and contributes to solving collective actions dilemmas (Putnam 1993).  
In democratic contexts, local governments act under the electoral mandate and on the 
interests of the voters (Jones and McDermott, 2004). If local institutional performance 
matches citizens’ demand and expectation, the elected local government may be rewarded 
through electoral support. Alternatively, voters may well call for a new administration in 
subsequent elections (James, 2010). 
Fiscal policies adopted by municipalities represent an indication of a local 
government’s priorities and affect the economic performance of the constituency (Jones et al., 
2009; Li et al., 2017). Those that are more capital- investment and property-tax oriented tend 
to be also associated with long-run socio-economic sustainability and with institutional 
transparency (Witko and Newmark, 2009). In contexts with more social capital, 
governmental orientations are more likely to be embraced by the citizens, who reward mayors 
with electoral support in subsequent elections. This is because individuals holding social 
capital tend to prefer planning capacity and decision-making based on forward- looking 
approaches (Anand and Poggi, 2018). This means that, within polities with high social capital, 
voters prefer social exchanges, and seek longer-term and more sustainable community 
benefits against short-term strategies (Christoforou, 2012). Citizens are also more aware of 
the community needs, and can better assess and recognize underperforming institutions by 
punishing mayors in the following electoral race (Boix and Posner, 1998). 
Following Uphoff (2000), we consider the structural dimension of social capital as 
one referring to the individual’s involvement in associational activities and social networks.1 
The choice of these components lies in the notion that citizens more involved in the 
                                                 
1
Cognitive social cap ital refers to elements of trust, values and beliefs contributing to cooperation and 
promoting pro-sociality among the individuals of a community. 
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“community affair” are civically more engaged, hence, more knowledgeable and informed 
about the community’s need, aware of local politicians’ conducts, and better judges of the 
quality of political decision-making ( Putnam 1993; Boix and Posner 19982; Scheufele et al., 
2004).3 We thus test whether an incumbent mayor who, during her mandate, adopted fiscal 
policies that are more capital investment oriented (rather than current expenditures) and more 
property tax oriented (rather than surcharge income tax), is more likely to be re-elected in 
contexts with a higher level of social capital. Hence, we address the moderating effect of 
social capital between fiscal policy and electoral payoff. 
Previous studies associate the structural dimension of social capital to different  
measures of socio-economic and institutional performance (Sabatini, 2008; Christoforou, 
2010). Less attention, however, has been devoted to the municipal dimension. In this respect, 
social capital has been found to be positively associated with local government financial 
surplus and expenditures per capita (Coffé and Geys, 2005; Menahem et al., 2011), public 
service performance and efficiency ( Tavits, 2006; Andrews, 2007) and citizens’ attitude 
towards government performance (Cusack, 1999; Rice, 2001). Furthermore, empirical 
evidence in the literature has reported a positive role of informal institutions and 
interpersonal trust among officials concerning public management resources, fiscal 
performance monitoring, and institutional transparency ( Lundin, 2007; De Renzio and 
Masud, 2011; Camussi et al., 2018). Yet, little consideration has been given to the role of 
informal institutions on the relationship between citizens’ voting decisions and local fiscal 
policy. Shedding light on the relational dynamics between informal institutions and their 
constraining effect on government decisions does contribute to the current academic and 
policy debate regarding the role of informal institutions on fiscal policy (Calcagno and López, 
2017). 
Given its profound economic and regional disparities (Ichino and Maggi, 2000; 
Nannicini et al., 2013) and its highly unequal distribution of social capital (Putnam, 1993), 
Italy represents an ideal context of analysis. Constituencies are subject to a common 
regulatory framework, characterized by the homogeneity of formal institutions and policy 
instruments, but without loss in cross-sectional and time variability regarding the variables of 
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 Bo ix and Posner (1998) point out that this mechanism works if there is homogeneity of interests in the 
community. The presence of too fragmented interests this mechanism might lead to a grid lock and hence to 
inefficiencies in the institutional performance.   
3
 While social capital is a necessary condition, it  might not be a sufficient one. Lowndes et al (2006), V., 
Pratchett, L., & Stoker, G. (2006) p ropose an interesting case study, showing that the coexistence of specific 
‘rules of use’ within a given stock of social capital are important factors conducive for political participation as 
well. 
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interest (Chiades et al. 2015, p.8). Since the late 1990s, Italy has implemented two significant 
reforms aiming at bringing local public institutions closer to the citizens’ needs and 
preferences: an electoral reform to appoint local governments and mayors, and a fiscal reform 
towards a more federalist system. These changes have been pursued by economically wealthy 
regions seeking greater autonomy, but were also advocated as remedies to stimulate those 
administrations in regions less developed and efficient.  
Our identification strategy is based on an individual- level dataset which includes all 
candidates in mayoral elections and merges it with administrative budgetary and electoral 
data for about 6,000 Italian municipalities over the period 2003-2012. Our empirical 
approach presents several advantages. First, by controlling for electoral fixed effects, it 
allows matching winners with challengers’ data within the same election reducing concerns 
for omitted variables bias which may derive from not observing election- level characteristics. 
Second, being elections nested within municipalities and provinces, we also indirectly control 
for municipal and provincial fixed effects. Third, our dataset includes both incumbents 
rerunning for office as well as candidates that have never been elected before. This allows the 
inclusion of an important subset of candidates to be used as a counterfactual group, and 
whose omission could be itself at the root of biased estimates.  Fourth, we control for 
candidates’ characteristics heterogeneity within a given election. Thus, another advantage of 
the within election matching estimator is that we can compare individual characteristics of 
incumbents with those of their direct challengers. Given our assumption that common 
election factors are the ones more likely to cause biased estimates, our results can be 
interpreted as causal. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the contextual 
framework, Section 3 discusses the theoretical underpinnings and the hypotheses; Section 4 
presents the data and the empirical strategy; Section 5 reports the results; Section 6 presents 
additional robustness analysis and Section 7 concludes. 
 
II. Italian Municipalities: Mayors and Fiscal Policy  
Two significant reforms were passed in Italy in 1993 and 1999 to increase both the political 
power of the mayors and the fiscal autonomy attributed to the municipalities. 
The 1993 reform introduced the direct election of the mayors and considerably 
straightened their power by giving them the right to appoint and dismiss the executive 
officers at will, and, more generally, to shape all local policies. The local administration is 
4 
composed of a mayor (Sindaco) who leads an executive committee (Giunta) and an elected 
City Council (Consiglio Comunale). The mayor is responsible for proposing the annual fiscal 
budget that the Consiglio Comunale must endorse, and he/she can propose changes in the 
fiscal policy including adjustment in the tax rate. Mayors are directly elected through a dual 
ballot when the municipality counts more than 15,000 citizens, and are subject to a two-term 
limit; after the mayor is elected so is the Council.  Voters can vote for the individual candidate 
and local political parties/lists. Candidates obtaining an absolute majority consisting of 50% 
of the votes become mayors. Otherwise, the first and second will compete in a second round, 
and possibly with the endorsement of the political parties whose candidates have been 
eliminated. More than one party/list can support the candidate mayor. However, voters can 
vote for a specific candidate and, simultaneously, for a list associated with another candidate 
(disjoint voting). If the political parties supporting the mayor receive between 50% and 60% 
of the votes, they receive 60% of the seats. Otherwise, the criterion of proportionality applies 
(Barone and De Blasio, 2013).4 The second reform was passed in 1999 and strengthened the 
fiscal autonomy of the municipalities. Following a general trend of decentralization in Italy, 
the Italian municipalities were also provided with a surcharge on their residents' income tax 
base. Along with the income tax, since 1993, the municipalities also had the traditional 
property tax. 
Both reforms were implemented to establish a closer relationship between public 
policy and the citizens at the local level, where several essential services were supplied. 
Today, Italian municipalities are responsible for the provision of several services including 
local transports, municipal police, waste management, water supply, nurseries, schools, 
culture, and recreation. In particular, the municipalities play a substantial role in term of their 
contribution to the overall level of investment in Italy. Over the 2000s, nearly half of the 
overall level of public investment in Italy has been made by municipalities. 
The municipalities can finance their investment expenditure by means of a) transfers 
from the Central government and the regional government (which include European funds) 
and incomes stemming from the sale of real estate; b) the surplus of the previous year; c) 
indebtedness - municipalities can raise new debts only for investment expenditure, and not 
for current expenditure. For municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants, transfers from the 
regional governments represent the most relevant source of funding for investment (from 38% 
in 2004 to 34% in 2012), while indebtedness is equal to 15% in both years. By contrast, in 
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 The elections usually take place between May and mostly June – in our sample this is the case for 93.4% of the 
elections. We are analyzing 4 main periods of elections, for a total of 19,174 single elections. 
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large municipalities (>5,000 inhabitants) the most re levant source was debt in 2004, 31%, 
and a budget surplus of 28% in 2012 (Chiades and Mengotto, 2013). 
In setting the level of current expenditure and investment expenditures, the 
municipalities need to comply with the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP). The DPS is an 
instrument of budget constraint introduced in 1999 under the law 448/1998, aiming to control 
the local government budget balance (Bartolini and Santolini, 2009; Grembi et al., 2012). The 
DSP is applied only to the municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. This means some 
2,251 municipalities, equal to 30 percent of the total when including those a Statuto Speciale, 
and thus covering about 74 percent of the overall investment expenditure (Chiades and 
Mengotto, 2013). 
Following the introduction of the DPS, the municipal governments were constrained 
to keep the growth of their fiscal gap—defined as the deficit, net of transfers and debt 
service—under tight control (i.e., zero growth after 2003). Debt service and transfers were 
excluded from the DSP, since mayors are not considered responsible for interests expenditure 
(often depending from previous management) and from transfers; however, avoiding 
excessive debt was the indirect objective of the DSP. From 2006 the DSP has been revised 
identifying the change of overall expenditure – both current and capital - as the only 
constraint. 
Investment, i.e., capital expenditure, accounts on average for 14% of the total budget. 
By contrast, current expenditure – including salaries for the personnel, purchases of goods 
and services, and other expenditures - is the most significant component of expenditures of 
the municipalities, averaging some 50% of the total budget in the considered period. The 
remaining portion includes the debt service and outsourced services. Over the considered 
years, on average the level of current expenditure has risen, while that of capital expenditure 
has reduced, in line with a general trend in Italy (Chiades and Mengotto, 2013; IRES, 2013).   
As far as the municipal revenues are concerned, the most relevant component is 
represented by taxes and revenues (around 36%), followed by transfers, other tariffs and fees, 
and loans. Over the years the 2000s, the composition of the revenues has significantly 
modified, in the direction of substituting fiscal transfer with municipal taxation, consistently 
with the spirit of the reforms about increasing the responsibility of mayors also by providing 
them greater fiscal autonomy. In particular, the transfers from the Central government have 
been substantially reduced, while those from the Regional governments have remained stable, 
since most of them are composed of grants from the European Cohesion Policy.  
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The most relevant taxes for the Italian municipalities are the property tax (Imposta 
Comunale Sugli Immobili, ICI, and later on IMU) and the surcharge on the personal income  
tax (Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone Fisiche, IRPEF). The revenue from IRPEF is, on 
average, 10% of municipal tax revenues, while that from IMU is, on average, 50% of 
municipal tax revenues (Grembi et al. 2012). The remaining share of tax revenues included 
the tax for garbage and that for other public services, followed by other minor taxes and fees.  
The tax rate of the IRPEF, in terms of the tax base and tax brackets, is defined by the 
central government while the municipal governments can only marginally raise a surcharge 
on the taxable income base, usually between 0 and 0.5%.  
The property tax, instead, is directly attributed to the fiscal policy of the local 
municipality and is, on average, 50% of municipal tax revenues (Grembi et al. 2012). The 
mayor has the authority to vary the property tax within a bracket from 0.4 to 0.7% of the legal 
home value5. The property tax is by far the principal source of revenue for the municipalities; 
it represents a more salient and a more efficient fiscal instrument than the surcharge income 
tax for two main reasons. Firstly, the property tax creates stronger incentives for private 
investment and savings, because it is more stable than the income tax since less affected by 
economic conditions and business cycle fluctuations. This makes the property tax more 
efficient than the surcharge income tax given a more sustainable and long-run socio-
economic growth (Oates, 2001; Liberati and Sacchi, 2013; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2016). 
Secondly, the property tax is a more transparent source of revenue than the surcharge income 




III. Social Capital, Municipal Fiscal Policy and Electoral Payoff: Two Research 
Hypotheses 
 
Communities affluent in social capital tend to prefer long to short-run political-economic 
strategies, and by doing so seeking a broader and more sustainable community benefit 
(Andriani and Christoforou 2016; Christoforou 2012). Recent research also demonstrates that 
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 The property tax has to be paid by owners (and landlord) of propert ies, land  and built areas for use as property, 
usufruct, housing or land rights; the tax base is the legal value of the property. By 2009 the main residence (first 
home) has been excluded from property tax (it accounts on average to 25% of the total tax), unless it  falls into 
the “deluxe” category. It is important to highlight that according to the law (DPR 22, Dec. 1986 n.917) mayors 
cannot determine or update the legal home values. Hence, mayors cannot manipulate the legal home values for 
public revenues purposes.       
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social capital is a valuable resource that helps explain individuals’ attitudes towards planning 
capacity and forward- looking decision making. By using a set of frontier models Anand and 
Poggi (2018) finds that individuals holding social capital tend to prefer decisions forward-
looking oriented.  
Public administrations aiming at long-run and sustainable socio-economic 
development adopt fiscal policies oriented towards public investments (Witko and Newmark, 
2009). Within the context of the municipality, empirical evidence associates social capital 
with public investment for the implementation of socio-economic and sustainable forward-
looking public policies in favor of public safety, public health, public education, and 
environmental protection (Schneider, 1987; Pierce et al., 2016). In 2009, the governor of the 
State of New York announced the use of public investments and other local government 
resources to implement a long-run socioeconomic and environmentally sustainable program. 
Similarly, at the beginning of 2000, New Mexico’s public administration announced a 
program investing in clean energy development in order to foster economic growth and 
environmental improvements. In this respect, the local Department of Finance and 
Administration ensures to invest public funding on renewable transportation fuels, the 
purchase of renewable electricity, the construction of “green” buildings, and renovation of 
state buildings as an opportunity to achieve sustainability goals for water and electricity, and 
improve the health in the workplace (Contrell 2009). Thus, compared to current expenditure, 
public investment in fixed-capital yields returns in the long run and positively affects the 
productivity of the local economy by providing, for instance, adequate infrastructures and 
more efficient transport systems to the community (Jones, 1990). By analyzing the factors 
influencing local government’s sustainability efforts adopted across U.S cities, Saha (2009) 
argues that pressures and expectations from the local community are among the main reasons 
driving the mayors to use the public investment for implementing public policies in favor of 
socioeconomic and environmental sustainability. This is more likely to occur in contexts with 
more social capital, since it facilitates the collaboration among individuals in collective 
activities through which citizens express preferences and exercise demand on government via 
civic engagement (Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999, p. 13). In such contexts, individuals are better 
informed about public policy plans and the related instruments required for the achievement 
of the community needs (Boix and Posner, 1998; Scheufele et al., 2004; Pierce et al., 2016).  
We posit that public investment is more likely to be rewarded in communities rich in 
social capital in that it shapes their preferences towards forward- looking socio-economic 
outcomes. Furthermore, citizens civically engaged can better monitor the actions of the 
8 
municipal governments and better assess the credibility of their commitments (Boix and 
Posner 1998; Putnam 1993). Hence, citizens tend to reward municipal governments that show 
credible commitments in taking good care of public resources and in acting efficiently and 
fairly (Feld and Frey, 2002). For instance, Barone and Mocetti (2011) detect better citizens’ 
attitude towards tax compliance in Italian municipalities where resources are spent more 
efficiently. This leads us to state the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Greater shares of capital investment vs. current spending lead to a higher probability of 
incumbent mayor reelection as social capital increases 
 
From the revenue perspective the property tax is more efficient than the income 
surcharge tax in that it has advantages for economic development. It also has desirable 
properties in terms of transparency and accountability (particularly in the case of Italy), since 
citizens can unambiguously attribute the decisions concerning the property tax to the 
municipal government and the mayor charge. This is not the case for the surcharge income 
tax, as this is collected together with other local and national surcharges (Bordignon et al., 
2017). Since social capital makes citizens less tolerant towards the moral hazard of their 
political representatives, more informed and engaged citizens reward more salient taxing 
activities and punish attempts of creating fiscal illusions (Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978; 
Nannicini et al., 2013). Further, property tax encourages citizens to keep politicians in check, 
since they have more knowledge of the amount of the tax revenue and of the fact that this will 
be used to pursue local policies in the place they live (Presbitero et al., 2014). Cabral and 
Hoxby (2012) show that the transparency and accountability of the fiscal budget can be 
undermined by opportunistic local policymakers who manipulate the composition of revenues 
substituting the more salient property tax with the less salient income one. This is supported  
by empirical studies about Italy suggesting that mayors shift from property to income taxes to 
hide the tax burden to citizens (Bordignon et al., 2017), and mainly when the electoral 
competition is sharp (Bracco et al., 2013). From here our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Greater shares of property tax vs. income surcharge lead to a higher probability of 
incumbent mayor reelection as social capital increases. 
   
9 
IV. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Data were collected from several sources (Table 1). Information on elections and 
demographic characteristics of candidates were provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (Ministero dell’Interno). The dataset includes the full universe of candidates for the 
municipalities under scrutiny. The dependent variable is th dummy ELECTED, equal to 1 if 
the candidate wins the election and 0 otherwise. The control variable INCUMBENT6 is a 
second dummy indicating whether the candidate is an incumbent running to be re-elected. A 
series of additional controls for candidates are: (i) the dummy GENDER, 0 if male to 1 if 
female; (ii) EDUCATION, a categorical variable indicating the educational level of the 
candidate; (iii) AGE expressed in years; (iv) categorical variable JOB, whose categories are 
codified in 3 groups (Dependent, Skilled, and Manager), and used each as a distinct dummy 
control.  
 
The Variable Social Capital  
Our measure of social capital derives from the item “Voice and Accountability” of the 
Institutional Quality Index (IQI). This is a composite indicator aiming to measure the quality 
of formal and informal institutions from years 2004 to 2012, and developed by Nifo and 
Vecchione (2014). This indicator is constructed at the provincial level, and captures the 
critical structural dimensions of social capital, including the participation rate in public 
elections; the number of associations; the number of social cooperatives, and finally, the 
cultural liveliness measured in terms of books published and purchased in book shops. The 
data used for the construction of the IQI items are derived from using different institutional 
sources, research institutes and professional registers, and the computation mechanism to  
build up the index is the same for every year available, ideal for panel analysis purposes. 
Following Nifo and Vecchione (2014), the index is normalized to vary from 0 to 1, and each 
variable is entered with a proper weight normalizing for the resident population in the 
province7. This gives the possibility to rank and compare local realities in terms of social 
capital endowment using the same indicator over the entire period of analysis and across 
different Italian provinces.  This indicator has been adopted in several empirical, institutional 
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 We built this variable in two diverse ways. (1) If the candidate is running right after the accomplishment of her 
first term as mayor, or (2) looking at the history and attributing the value one to this dummy also if the candidate 
is rerunning after skipping some electoral races. Estimates do not change relevantly so we report the results 
obtained by using definition (2). The reason is that the clear majority of incumbents in the sample decided to 
rerun in the electoral race right after the ending of their first mandate. Results are available under request. 
7
 For further details, see Nifo and Vecchione (2014: pp. 1634-1636)  
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studies relating the quality of the formal and informal institutions to human capital ( Nifo and 
Vecchione, 2014; Buch et al., 2017; Nifo et al., 2017), and public sector performance 
(Agovino et al., 2017). We take the period average of the index, which is used to proxy also 
for the social capital index in 2003, because the longitudinal variability is minimal and to 
convey synthetic information of the social capital experienced by the province in the period 
of our sample. Then we log-transform this indicator to make its distribution closer to normal.8 
 
Variables of Fiscal Instruments: Expenditures and Revenues  
Data on municipal expenditures and revenues span from the fiscal years 2003 to 2012 and are 
from OPEN POLIS, an Italian open-data independent association. 9  We use this data to 
construct our fiscal instruments of interest, which are the share of capital expenditures over 
total expenditures (CAPITAL RATIO) and the share of property tax over total tax 
(PROPERTY RATIO): 
 
CAPITAL RATIO= CapitalExp. / (CapitalExp. + CurrentExp.); 
0 < CAPITAL RATIO < 1 
 
PROPERTY RATIO = Prop. Tax Rev. / (Prop. Tax Rev. + Inc. Tax Rev.); 
0 < PROPERTY RATIO <1 
 
Both indexes are constructed so to have the support (0,1).  Because these indexes vary 
from year to year, to match them with candidates in elections, we took averages from the 
election year t to t-y, being t the election year, and y the year after the previous election. Since 
y is not constant, it is indexed on a case by case through careful coding to match precisely 
with the previous election year. For clarity, as the usual time span is five years, y is supposed 
to be equal to four in every case, according to the Italian Electoral Law. However, y takes 
values smaller than four in the case of anticipated elections. This might have occurred for 
several reasons; political and personal issues involving the governing mayor, Councils’ 
demises for budgetary defaults, corruption, and this only to cite the most usual. Finally, being 
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 In any case, additional estimates show that our results would not change when using the yearly value of the 
social capital index. 
9
 English version of the site: http://www.openpolis.it/eng/. 
11 
both indexes highly skewed, and as customary with micro-data, we used logit transformations 




The Empirical Strategy:  within-election matching estimator 
The resulting dataset contains candidate level information grouped within elections and 
municipalities for each election for the 15 Regioni a Stauto Ordinario11 out of the 20 Italian 
Regions. Our unit of observation is the electoral candidates in each municipal level election 
(see Table E in the online Appendix for details on these data). Our data match individual 
characteristics of candidates as electoral success, job type, education level, with budget 
indicators at the municipal level, and social capital at the provincial one. This allows running 
a within election matching estimator, and compare individual characteristics of incumbents 
with those of their challengers in each election. Table 1 also shows the descriptive statistics 
of the variables used in the regressions.12 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Our models’ illustrations are reported below. First, we report the baseline 
specifications for each fiscal indicator without social capital as the Conditional Logit version 
of Eq.1, reported as linear regression for clarity. We then test our hypotheses by including the 
social capital variable as in Eq.2. Eq.1 below shows the specification’s detail: 
 
ELECTEDij = b0 + b1INCUMBENTij + b2 INCUMBENTij× 
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 Details on the transformation of the indexes available upon request. 
11
 Italian municipalities are a b it more than 8,000. However, our data do not cover three Regions with special 
statute (Regioni a Statuto Speciale), as Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giu lia, and Val d’Aosta, and show 
limited information about the two other regions with special statute, Sicily and Sardinia. For this reason, we 
omit them from our analysis. This reflects  also on the subset of candidates that we use. 
12
 Note that the fiscal indexes vary mostly because there are very s mall municipalities with almost no income 
tax and capital spending in  some cases and almost no property and current spending in others. Regard ing social 
capital this is instead a structural feature of the Italian regions, being the European country in which within  
variation is larger. 
12 
Here, i refers to candidates and j to the election. b0 is a common intercept, b1 is the 
coefficient measuring how the status of being incumbent contributes to the likelihood of 
being re-elected. b2 is the coefficient estimating the effect of the interaction terms between 
being incumbent and two budget composition indexes to an incumbent’s re-election chance. 
The variables of fiscal instruments are indexed by k, which indicates the specific municipality. 
Note that, since the k values of the local fiscal indexes do not vary within election j, the 
indexes variables can enter our specification only through its interaction with the indicator of 
incumbent status. This is because we control for elections’ fixed effects, as captured by the 
term vj. The use of elections’ fixed-effects allows comparing winner and losers within the 
same election, and so it can also be interpreted as matching candidates within the same 
election. Therefore, using vj allows interpreting the equation as a matching estimator 
comparing the individual characteristics of the winner with an average of of her competitors 
within the same election, and not across the whole sample. Note that elections fixed effects 
absorb the municipalities fixed effects – i.e., municipal and year level variables do not change 
across candidates within the same election. They also have the identification power of 
controlling for unobserved election characteristics, like weather, sudden changes in public  
opinion or, for example, sudden unexpected changes in the median voter’s position.  
Finally, we include the job-type dummy (JOBi) and the vector c’X including 
coefficients for each candidate’s characteristic (EDUCATION, GENDER, and AGE). 
Summing up, our identification strategy, controls for individual characteristics and 
matches the same characteristics by comparing candidates running in the same election. 
Finally, the matching ensures a consistent reduction in omitted variable bias, as it controls for 
a series of environmental characteristics common to candidates within the same election. For 
these reasons, our results can be interpreted as causal. 
Eq.2 shows the extended model specification when we add SOCIAL CAPITAL 
interacting with the dummy for incumbent status and with the fiscal variables CAPITAL 
RATIOk and PROPERTY RATIOk. The regressions are running on the expenditures and revenues 
sides, and the index measuring social capital, as follows: 
 
ELECTEDij = b0 + b1 INCUMBENTij + [b2 INCUMBENTij * (Capital Ratio or 
Property Ratio)k]+ b3 [INCUMBENTij * SOCIAL CAPITALw] + 
 [b4 INCUMBENTij× (Capital Ratio or Property Ratio)k ×SOCIAL CAPITALw] +  






In Eq.2 b4 is the coefficient of interest, the one testing our hypotheses, according to 
which it is expected to be positive.13 For social capital, we introduced the notation “w” to 
indicate the province to which the municipality and election belong. 14 Note that since social 
capital is measured at the provincial level, the within variation is captured from the 
incumbent interaction terms. 
Since our dependent variable is a dummy, we use conditional logit (CLOGIT) 
estimation. 15  Moreover, for ease of interpretation, we report the odds-ratio result, which 
means we expect the estimates of b2 in Eq.1 and b4 in Eq.2 to be larger than one for a positive 
association, between the triple interaction and the probability of winning the elections.16 
 
V. Results 
Table 2 reports our estimation results and tests our two hypotheses. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Column 1 and Column 2 report the estimation results of Eq.1 (model with double 
interactions) about the fiscal variable for CAPITAL RATIO and PROPERTY RATIO 
respectively. In both cases, as expected, the probability of being re-elected increases among 
incumbent candidates (INCUMBENT), with the levels of education (EDUCATION), among male 
candidates (GENDER = 0), with highly-skilled types of job (JOB) and reduces with age (AGE). 
Since our dataset includes all candidates in an election, and not only the most competitive one, 
                                                 
13
 Note that the constitutive terms of the fiscal variab les and social capital (and their joint coefficient) cann ot be 
estimated because they are absorbed by the electoral fixed effect.  
14
 Note that technically, we should indicate ELECTEDijkw to indicate candidate “i”  running in election “j” of 
municipality “k” and province “w”. We avoid doing it to not complicate the notation. Note also that election “j” 
is nested in municipality “k” which is nested in province “w”.  
15
With our structure a LOGIT model with elections’ fixed effects would encounter the incidental parameter 
model, i.e., it would be biased because the number of parameters to estimate would be very large in relation to 
the observations available (depending on the specification, we count up to 13 thousand elections for a bit more 
than 35 thousand candidates). See Allison (2009) fo r an example. Being able to  control also for common 
municipal characteristics is important for three main reasons: i. municipalities in some areas of the country can 
have already a large stock of capital investment, thus reducing the scope for new ones; ii. municipalities in the 
Southern regions can get additional investment funding from national and communitarian policies; iii. Some 
municipalities can require larger investments due to specific conditions, such as for instance the morphological 
characteristics. 
16
 In all regressions we follow Cameron, A. C., & Miller, D. L. (2015). A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust 
inference. Journal of Human Resources, 50(2), 317-372, and estimated robust standard errors clustered at the 
Italian regional level, the largest geographical level available in the multilevel data structure at hand. 
14 
the electoral advantage of the incumbent is against the average challenger rather than her 
most competitive one. Estimations in column 1 indicate that CAPITAL RATIO increases the 
probability of re-election of incumbents; it also shows a positive interaction between 
INCUMBENT and CAPITAL RATIO, which amounts to a 20% increase in the odds ratio of the 
chances of being ELECTED for those incumbents who maintained a fiscal spending structure 
more lenient towards capital spending. This is not the case when we consider PROPERTY 
RATIO in column 2 where the joint effect of being incumbent and having a high property 
tax/income tax ratio is not associated to re-election, the coefficient is close to one and not 
statistically significant.  
Columns 3 and 4 report the estimations of Eq.2 and test our two hypotheses with triple 
interactions. Estimations in column 3 confirm our first hypothesis. The coefficient of the 
triple interaction variable between INCUMBENT, BUDGET IND., and SOCIAL CAPITAL 
suggests that a fiscal spending agenda more oriented towards capital spending increases the 
probability for an incumbent mayor to be re-elected in contexts with more social capital. 
Likewise, column 4 confirms our second hypothesis suggesting that fiscal agenda 
characterized by a high ratio of property tax increase the likelihood of re-election for 
incumbents re-running for their office in contexts with more social capital.17 This is captured 
by the statistically significant coefficient of the interaction variable between INCUMBENT 
BUDGET IND., and SOCIAL CAPITAL.18 These results differ from previous works that do 
not include informal institutions and that show that to win re-election mayors shift from 
property to income tax to hide the tax burden (e.g., Bordignon et al., 2017).  When informal 
institutions are included in the model social capital can provide an incentive towards fiscal 
transparency in budget decisions.  
Our results are also robust to a change in sample size. The sample size in the case of 
PROPERTY RATIO is smaller than in the case of CAPITAL RATIO due to missing values. 
However, our results for CAPITAL RATIO do not change even we re-estimate the matching 
mode using the same sample used for PROPERTY RATIO19.  
Focusing on the expenditures side, Table 3 provides a more intuitive reading of our 
results, which outlay average estimated probabilities of elections for subsets of the population 
in the sample both for the incumbent and challenger states. 
                                                 
17
 Table A, in the online Appendix, reports the estimates for each single pillar of our measure of social capital. 
We show that the aggregate index better exp lains a concept of social capital that interacts with cu ltural 
awareness and social aggregation to be effective. 
18
 It should be noted that several times the central government has frozen local surcharge rates; this makes our 
result more dependent on the level property tax, rather than to changes in the local income surcharge.  
19
 See Table B in the online Appendix. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
The subsets are created by combining quartiles of SOCIAL CAPITAL with quartiles of 
CAPITAL RATIO. It is divided in two panels presenting the percentage difference within 
candidates’ states and concerning the baseline probability (chosen to be the one for the 1st 
quartiles of SOCIAL CAPITAL and CAPITAL RATIO, and called Q11), and the differences 
between candidates’ states both in absolute average probability values and percentages values. 
We find that (panel A) the average probabilities of reelection by shifting from Q11 to Q44 are 
15.3% larger for an incumbent. We also find that (panel B) the incumbent advantage, being 
about 57.2% larger in the Q11 case, increase to 120.1% in Q44, suggesting that the joint 
contribution from shifting from smallest to largest quartiles of SOCIAL CAPITAL and 
CAPITAL RATIO doubles the incumbent’s advantage on challengers.20 
    
VI. Robustness Analysis  
 
Table 4 presents three different robustness tests. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show the same triple-interaction regressions in the 
baselines respectively for municipalities with more than 5,000 residents, which are also 
bound by the Domestic Stability Pact, and those with less than 5,000 which are not. The 
estimates are larger than the baselines’, at 1% significant for those municipalities bounded in 
their levels of spending by the Stability Pact. Some preliminary studies have found that the 
DSP has constraint investment more than current expenditure, in that the former is a more 
flexible dimension of the budget. Our result can depend on the fact that when the DSP is not 
in force, the choice between investment and current expenditure is less stringent; by contrast, 
in the presence of a constraint, the composition of expenditures becomes more salient and 
determinant for their re-election. Overall this result is in line with recent research confirming 
the effectiveness and binding power of the Pact in Italy as in (Grembi et al., 2016). 
                                                 
20
 As said above, social capital is a composite indicator including d ifferen t dimensions. Running the same model 
for each of the dimension, we find that the number of associations has the larger effect (significant at the 10% 
level), while the dimension capturing reading are smaller in size but significant at 1%. This seems to suggest a 
concept of social capital that interacts with cultural awareness (books) and social aggregation to be effective.     
16 
Column (3) includes trends of provincial employment to account for local economic 
conditions as possible factors for electing politicians. We find, however, that this indicator 
does not play a role in determining the re-election of the incumbent politician. This might be 
because in Italy the responsibility of economic conditions tends to be attributed to politicians 
appointed at the national level and to the policies enacted by the national government rather 
than the local ones.21 
Table 5 presents a second battery of additional robustness tests which aim at 
controlling for the political, budgetary cycle effect, in which we split our sample into two 
averages of the CAPITAL RATIO indicator. One is taking into account only the election year 
and the previous one. The other, when possible, all the other years of the electoral cycle. The 
first indicator should capture more precisely an electoral cycle effect than the second. Table 6 
first presents the 2-way and 3-way interactions results obtained by running regressions with 
the CAPITAL RATIO indicators constructed to take into account the electoral cycle (columns 1 
and 2, where Cycle (C=1) is equal to 1) and those who should be less able to capture it 
(columns 3 and 4, where Cycle (C=0)). As expected, the coefficients on the double 
interactions variable INCUMBENT × CAPITAL RATIO are more significant when C=1 both 
in the 2-way and 3-way interaction models. In the 2-way interaction model the odds-ratio 
coefficient when C=1 is in fact 1.181 in column (1) and higher than the twin coefficient 1.098 
in column (3) when C=0, and with both coefficient significant at the 1% levels. A similar 
pattern is shown by looking at columns (2) and (4), where the odds ratio of 1.350 (C=1) is 
larger than 1.253 (C=0), with both coefficients significant at the 1% level again.   
[Table 5 about here] 
   Our results suggest the presence of an opportunistic electoral cycle using capital 
expenditure (Benito et al., 2013; see for instance Veiga and Veiga, 2007). However, the triple 
interaction term, involving the contribution of social capita l (INCUMBENT × CAPITAL 
RATIO × SOCIAL CAPITAL) does not seem to capture any differential effect when shifting 
from C1 to C0. The odd-ration coefficients are in fact very similar: 1.145 (C=1) and 1.148 
(C=0). This suggests that: i. our main results do not depend on the presence of opportunistic 
electoral cycle; ii. high social capital also prevents incumbents’ opportunistic behavior, for 
                                                 
21
 Starting from 2013 the Local Stability Pact was extended to the municipalities with a population between 
1,000 and 5,000 residents; for this reasons we have also run our baseline estimates dropping from the sample the 
years 2013-2014. The results are basically unchanged and not reported here, but available upon request.  
17 
instance by increasing political accountability as already discussed above ( Nannicini et al., 
2013; Bordignon et al., 2017).22  
 
VII. Conclusions 
Public spending and raising revenue through fiscal policies are essential functions for local 
governments. While, in principle, only fiscal decisions matching citizens’ demand and 
expectations should be rewarded with electoral support, the reality has proved much more 
complicated than that. We analyze this relational mechanism by considering the role of 
informal institutions embedded in social capital as a moderator factor between fiscal policy 
and the response of citizens at the ballot. As such, we contribute to a better understanding of 
the mechanisms through which social capital affects local fiscal policy.  
We show that the presence of social capital provides a prize for fiscal policies 
characterized by long-term expenditure and a more efficient revenue structure. In this regard, 
one can speculate that social capital may favor the reallocation of the municipal fiscal budget 
towards public investment vis-à-vis current expenditures and towards property tax vis-à-vis 
surcharge income tax, thus enhancing the efficiency and transparency of local public policy.23 
Our evidence also speaks to the overarching rationale behind the two major reforms 
passed in Italy in the 1990s aiming at moving the government closer to the citizens, by 
introducing the direct election of mayors and making them more responsible by strengthening 
fiscal autonomy. A major claim of fiscal federalism theory (Oates, 1999) is that 
decentralization improves the ability of local institutions to tailor specific policies to better 
meet citizens’ demands (e.g., Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). This gets reflected in 
the citizens’ satisfaction (e.g. Espasa et al., 2017; Filippetti and Sacchi, 2016). This paper 
qualifies these results showing that decentralization works relatively well in the presence of 
high levels of social capital. In social contexts where individuals value forward-looking and 
transparent fiscal policies, decentralization promotes better public policies. In line with some 
recent literature (Tantardini et al., 2017), this suggests that a higher stock of social capital in 
the local community benefits the local public sector financial performance. 
                                                 
22
 In the online Appendix, Table D, we report estimates splitting the sample between high and low contestability 
in the elections. We find that our results hold for low contestability elections. 
23
 Regard ing the latter in particu lar we need to say that evidence is, overall, less convincing. This could be for 
the smaller sample or also because transparency might be not covered by social capital’s structural dimensions 
as for expenditures. This could also be a reason for the weaker results when looking at the indicator based on the 
revenues’ structure. We thank one of the referees for rising this point. 
 
18 
In terms of policy recommendations, decentralization policies should be coupled with 
initiatives to improve the capacity of the local institutions to stimulate the accumulation of 
social capital, exploiting the circumstance in which decentralization itself tends to encourage 
citizens’ knowledge and information about local fiscal policies (De Mello, 2011). This could 
be pursued by employing programs that favor the capacity-building of civic associations, 
including organizations for environmental, human, democratic rights, and that enable their 
participation to the local governance. Indeed, social capital in a community is greatly 
enhanced when civic associations, community groups, local NGOs and local government 
agencies come together to work on issues of importance to the community that requires broad 
cooperation to accomplish (Pierce et al., 2002). In this respect, decentralized geopolitical 
contexts might represent a more suitable institutional environment for providing to the local 
associations more formal and informal avenues for participation, engagement and closer 
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TABLES AND FIGURES FOR THE TEXT 
TABLE 1 DATA: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max Description and Source 
Elected 39,351 0.428 0.495 0 1 
Dummy = 1 if the candidate is elected mayor 




16,352 0.900 0.103 0.004 0.99 
Revenues (PROPERTY RATIO): Ratio property on the sum of property plus income taxes. 
Logit transforms used in regressions. 




38,327 0.096 0.090 0.001 0.91 
Expenditures (CAPITAL RATIO): ratio of capital on the sum of capital plus current 
expenditures. Log and Logit transforms used in regressions  




39,351 0.228 0.420 0 1 
Dummy = 1 if the candidate is the incumbent mayor rerunning for office 




38,980 0.436 0.170 0.012 0.99 
Log of the average “Voice” index, from 0 to 1, averaged for the period 2004-2012 
Source: IQI: https://sites.google.com/site/institutionalqualityindex/home; See A. Nifo 
and G. Vecchione (2014) 
 
EDUCATION:  
1 = Below High School; 
2 = High School Diploma; 
3 = College degree and above 
39,351 2.304 0.685 1 3 
Categorical variable measuring the education level attained by the candidate. 
Sources: Italian Ministry of Interior (biographical plus electoral data) 
AGE (log of years) 39,046 3.886 0.228 2.9 4.5 
Log of age in years 
Sources: Italian Ministry of Interior (biographical plus electoral data) 
 
GENDER (0=male) 39,351 0.130 0.336 0 1 
Dummy 0 if male 
Sources: Italian Ministry of Interior (biographical plus electoral data) 
 
JOB CODES: 
 1 = baseline pool of job types; 
2= dependent labor; 
3 = manager professional or self-employed; 
4= skilled labor. 
39,351 2.292 0.868 1 4 
Categorical variable measuring the job type of the candidate (4 categories total). 
Sources: Italian Ministry of Interior (biographical plus electoral data) 
i 
TABLE 2 – EXPENDITURES, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND RE-ELECTION  
CONDLOGIT - MATCHING ESTIMATOR EXPENDITURES, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS DUMMY ELECTED 
ODDS RATIOS REPORTED IN ALL REGRESSIONS 
Index of Budget Composition :  
CAPITAL RATIO               PROPERTY TAX 
(Log Transform) 
CAPITAL 








(1) (2) (3) (4) 
INCUMBENT (RERUNNING CANDIDATE) 5.906*** 3.860*** 12.982*** 4.752*** 
 
(11.064) (13.431) (7.812) (6.444) 
INCUMBENT  × BUDGET INDICATOR 1.192*** 0.968 1.392*** 1.042 
 
(5.072) (-1.201) (4.063) (0.667) 
INCUMBENT  × SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 2.315*** 1.219 
  
 (3.939) (1.306) 
INCUMBENT  × SOCIAL CAPITAL  ×  BUDGET INDICATOR 
 
 1.178*** 1.097** 
  
 (2.760) (2.030) 
EDUCATION 
1 = Below High School 
2 = High School Diploma 
3 = College degree and above 
1.174*** 1.174*** 1.176*** 1.175*** 
 
(4.990) (3.236) (5.028) (3.244) 
AGE 0.620*** 0.615*** 0.620*** 0.617*** 
 
(-8.753) (-4.610) (-8.710) (-4.562) 
GENDER (0=MALE) 0.803*** 0.755*** 0.802*** 0.753*** 
 
(-3.614) (-4.149) (-3.642) (-4.192) 
Baseline Job: Other Labor (e.g. Army) 
 
   
JOB: DEPENDENT LABOR 1.048 1.036 1.050 1.035 
 
(1.031) (0.580) (1.059) (0.559) 
JOB: MANAGER 1.084** 1.085** 1.085** 1.086** 
 
(2.108) (2.361) (2.110) (2.411) 
JOB: SKILLED LABOR 0.881** 0.861 0.881** 0.855 
 
(-2.259) (-1.398) (-2.292) (-1.471) 
Election fixed effects Included Included Included Included  
OBSERVATIONS 32,253 14,033 32,253 14,033 
MATCHING GROUPS 12,979 5,564 12,979 5,564 
MUNICIPALITIES 6,132 4,542 6,132 4,542 
Notes: Robust and Region-Clustered Standard Errors. ***p<0.01; **p<005;  t-stat reported together with Odd-Rat ios. Observations 
from 15 “Regioni a Statuto Ordinario” RSO. If ballot, only  ballot’s results in sample. Matching Group: Elections. Budget Indicator: 
Log transform of the index obtained divid ing capital expenditures by the sum of capital p lus current expenditures in columns (1) and (2). 
  
ii 
TABLE 3 – JOINT DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES 
CONDLOGIT - MATCHING ESTIMATOR EXPENDITURES, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS DUMMY ELECTED 
 
(A) Percentage Changes from Baseline (1Q Social Capital, 1Q Capital Ratio) 
CAPITAL RATIO Quartiles. Incumbents. 
 
CAPITAL RATIO Quartiles. Challengers. 
    1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 
 









1Q 0% -1% 5% 7% 
2Q 0.4% 3.6% 7.4% 14.7% 
 
2Q -12% -11% -8% -3% 
3Q 1.9% 6.2% 11.6% 14.8% 
 
3Q -16% -15% -12% -8% 
4Q -1.2% 5.4% 8.3% 15.3% 
 
4Q -23% -23% -22% -18% 
(B) Incumbent - Challengers (Differences) 
Incumbent - Challengers Probability Difference 
 
Incumbent - Challengers Probability (% Difference) 
CAPITAL RATIO Quartiles 
 
CAPITAL RATIO Quartiles 
  
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 
 
  








1Q 57.2% 64.7% 60.6% 59.3% 
2Q 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.36 
 
2Q 79.4% 82.7% 83.4% 86.4% 
3Q 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.38 
 
3Q 90.8% 96.2% 99.4% 95.5% 
4Q 
0.34 0.38 0.40 0.43 
  4Q 
101.9% 113.9% 119.0% 120.1% 
Notes: Robust and Region-Clustered Standard Errors. ***p<0.01; **p<005; t-stat reported together with Odd-Ratios. 
 
 
TABLE 4 – ROBUSTNESS TESTS 1 
CONDLOGIT - MATCHING ESTIMATOR EXPENDITURES, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS DUMMY ELECTED 
 ODDS RATIOS REPORTED IN ALL REGRESSIONS (1) (2) (3) 
TYPE OF ROB CHECK > POP ≥ 5K POP < 5K EMPLOYMENT  
INCUMBENT  × CAPITAL RATIO 
× SOCIAL CAPITAL 
1.327*** 1.166* 1.161*** 
 
(2.796) (1.954) (2.810) 
INCUMBENT  × CAPITAL RATIO 1.545*** 1.355*** 1.348*** 
 
(4.401) (2.578) (3.826) 
INCUMBENT (RERUNNING) 24.162*** 9.341*** 19.348** 
 
(7.831) (5.834) (2.105) 
INCUMBENT   × SOCIAL CAPITAL 4.362*** 1.841** 2.191*** 
 
(3.893) (2.569) (3.769) 
INCUMBENT   × EMPLOYMENT 
  
0.991 
   
(-0.422) 
Election fixed effects Included Included Included 
OBSERVATIONS 11,714 20,541 32,255 
MATCHING GROUPS    
CONTROLS    





TABLE 5 – ROBUSTNESS TESTS 2: CONTROLLING FOR THE ELECTORAL POLITICAL CYCLE 
CONDLOGIT - MATCHING ESTIMATOR EXPENDITURES, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS DUMMY ELECTED 
ODDS RATIOS REPORTED IN ALL REGRESSIONS (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 EXP INDICATOR LOG TRANSFORM 









INCUMBENT  5.798*** 12.205*** 4.516*** 9.196*** 
 
(9.886) (6.670) (10.488) (6.676) 
INCUMBENT × CAPITAL RATIO 1.181*** 1.350*** 1.098*** 1.253*** 
 
(3.952) (3.733) (2.851) (2.700) 


















Election fixed effects                                                                       Included       Included       Included    Included 
MATCHING GROUPS     
CONTROLS     
Notes: C = 1 means that average has been computed only taking into account the election and the year before the election. C =  0 
is a complementary to C = 1, and considers only indicators’ average that use all the other years available, with the exception of 
the election year and the year before. Robust and Region-Clustered Standard Errors. ***p<0.01; **p<005; t-stat reported 
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This appendix presents figures and tables including an additional battery of robustness 
tests.  
Figure A1 




Fiscal indicators – Municipal Distribution 
Ratio Capital to Current Expenditures (Logs) 
Average 2003-2012 










Table A Regressions with subdimensions of the ‘Voice’ index of the IQI data  
As can be inferred from the regressions reported in Table A below, The ‘voice’ index utilized in the main 
text seems to combine the size effect of associations (still significant at the 10% level), and the more 
precise, but smaller in size, coefficients from ‘books.’ This means that the aggregate index better explains 
the concept of social capital that interacts with cultural awareness (books) and social aggregation to be 
effective. By contrast, the results about social cooperatives can reflect a top-down process created by 
national- level organizations that operate in the territory and hardly fit at least with the idea of social capital 
that we propose in this paper. 
 
TABLE A - WITH DETAILED “VOICE” COMPONENTS FOR CAPITAL RATIO 
CONDLOGIT - MATCHING ESTIMATOR EXPENDITURES, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS DUMMY ELECTED 
ODDS RATIOS REPORTED IN ALL REGRESSIONS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











INC × SOCIAL × CAPITAL 1.031*** 1.080*** 0.976 1.147* 1.180 
 
(4.228) (2.946) (-0.505) (1.942) (0.912) 
INC× CAPITAL 1.423*** 1.345*** 1.117 1.571*** 1.242* 
 
(6.354) (4.265) (1.307) (2.886) (1.932) 
INC × SOCIAL 1.128*** 1.477*** 0.995 1.835** 3.071 
 
(3.489) (4.493) (-0.021) (2.246) (1.537) 
INC 11.717*** 10.978*** 5.360*** 20.092*** 8.702*** 
 
(8.210) (8.909) (4.668) (4.736) (4.690) 
EDUCATION 
 
1.174*** 1.176*** 1.174*** 1.176*** 1.176*** 
 
1 = Below High School 
2 = High School Diploma 
3 = College degree and above 
(4.975) (5.022) (4.991) (5.000) (4.980) 
     
AGE 0.619*** 0.620*** 0.620*** 0.621*** 0.620*** 
 
(-8.857) (-8.737) (-8.693) (-8.847) (-8.687) 
GENDER (MALE = 0) 0.802*** 0.801*** 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.803*** 
 
(-3.646) (-3.668) (-3.622) (-3.639) (-3.611) 
JOB: DEPENDENT LABOR 1.050 1.052 1.048 1.043 1.050 
 
(1.022) (1.094) (1.027) (0.981) (1.059) 
JOB: MANAGER 1.084** 1.085** 1.084** 1.080** 1.085** 
 
(2.053) (2.083) (2.113) (2.011) (2.116) 
JOB: SKILLED LABOR 0.880** 0.882** 0.881** 0.879** 0.880** 
 
(-2.308) (-2.308) (-2.258) (-2.279) (-2.282) 
Election fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 32,255 32,255 32,255 32,255 32,255 
Matching Groups 12,979 12,979 12,979 12,979 12,979 
Municipalities 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 
Controls      
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parentheses . Robust and Region-Clustered Standard Errors. ***p<0.01; **p<005; t-stat reported 
together with Odd-Rat ios. Observations from 15 “Regioni a Statuto Ordinario” RSO. If ballot, only ballot’s results in the sample. 
Matching Group: Elections. Budget Indicator: Log transform of the index obtained dividing capital expenditures by the sum of 










Table B. Validation test. 
 
As there is a significant difference between the revenues and expenditures samples due to missing data, 
we rerun the expenditures (larger) sample by restricting the observations to only those nonmissing in 
the revenues sample. Also, in this case, the results are very similar than those obtained when using the 
full sample. 
 
TABLE B –RESULTS WITH THE SAME REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES USING COMPARABLE 
SAMPLES 
CONDLOGIT - MATCHING ESTIMATOR EXPENDITURES, DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS DUMMY ELECTED 
ODDS RATIOS REPORTED IN ALL REGRESSIONS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Property Tax Capital Exp Property Tax Capital Exp 
INCUMBENT  3.860*** 5.698*** 4.752*** 14.677*** 
 
(13.431) (9.449) (6.444) (6.485) 
INCUMBENT × FISCAL INDICATOR 0.968 1.205*** 1.042 1.498*** 
 
(-1.201) (3.892) (0.667) (4.039) 
INCUMBENT × SOCIAL CAPITAL 
  
1.219 2.821*** 
   
(1.306) (3.276) 
INCUMBENT × FISCAL INDICATOR × SOCIAL CAPITAL 
  
1.097** 1.267*** 




1.174*** 1.178*** 1.175*** 1.178*** 
 
(3.236) (3.286) (3.244) (3.270) 
1 = Below High School 
2 = High School Diploma 
 3 = College degree and above 
    
AGE 0.615*** 0.622*** 0.617*** 0.622*** 
 
(-4.610) (-4.510) (-4.562) (-4.533) 
GENDER (MALE = 0) 0.755*** 0.755*** 0.753*** 0.753*** 
 
(-4.149) (-4.130) (-4.192) (-4.181) 
JOB: DEPENDENT LABOR 1.036 1.039 1.035 1.039 
 
(0.580) (0.612) (0.559) (0.608) 
JOB: MANAGER 1.085** 1.087** 1.086** 1.087** 
 
(2.361) (2.365) (2.411) (2.366) 
JOB: SKILLED LABOR 0.861 0.868 0.855 0.862 
 
(-1.398) (-1.322) (-1.471) (-1.396) 
Election fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
OBSERVATIONS 14,033 14,023 14,033 14,023 
MATCHING GROUPS 5,564  5,564  5,564  5,564  
MUNICIPALITIES  4,542  4,542  4,542  4,542  




Table C. Trying the linear probability model (LPM) 
In table C below, we show the results obtained when using the Linear Probability Model (LPM). In our 
case, the LPM does not produce significant estimates. LPM - with our data - is a poor specification, as we 
wrestle with highly skewed data. Our exercise of re-estimating with LPM shows in fact that, for 
expenditures, 40 and more percent of the estimated probabilities fall outside the (0,1) natural range of a 
probability measure. This test ensures us that the Conditional Logit proposed is the best specification. 
 
TABLE C – LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL. OLS REGRESSION 
  EXPENDITURES REVENUES 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
INCUMBENT  0.674*** 0.904*** 0.506*** 0.581*** 
 
(10.416) (6.727) (0.045) (0.107) 
INCUMBENT X FISCAL INDICATOR 0.066*** 0.112** -0.012 0.006 
 
(4.516) (2.951) (0.013) (0.020) 



















 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049** 0.049** 
 
(3.940) (3.968) (0.021) (0.021) 
1 = Below High School 
2 = High School Diploma 
3 = College degree and above     
AGE -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.160*** 
 
(-7.313) (-7.305) (0.043) (0.043) 
GENDER -0.069** -0.069** -0.085*** -0.086*** 
 
(-2.591) (-2.621) (0.027) (0.027) 
JOB: DEPENDENT LABOR 0.014 0.014 0.008 0.007 
 
(0.691) (0.700) (0.027) (0.026) 
JOB: MANAGER 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.025 
 
(1.429) (1.431) (0.016) (0.016) 
JOB: SKILLED LABOR -0.041* -0.041* -0.051 -0.052 
 
(-1.872) (-1.909) (0.041) (0.041) 
Election fixed effects      Included     Included   Included Included 
OBSERVATIONS 36,545 36,545 15,675 15,675 
R-SQUARED 0.273 0.274 0.256 0.258 
PREDICTION % OUT OF SAMPLE 8.76% 40.77% 0.00% 1.28% 
ELECTION FIXED EFFECTS 
(MATCHING GROUPS) 
    
 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
ix 
Table D. High vs. low contestability 
We split groups between those elections above and below the median of the contestability measure. 
Contestability is measured as the percentage points difference between the winner and best challenger. We 
find that our results hold for low contestability elections. This seems to be in line with those studies that 
find that stronger government have more room for maneuvering their budget. Though not directly related 
to our research question, there is some endogeneity; future research should explore more in depth the role 
of close or highly contestable electoral competitions on fiscal policies and mediating effect of social capital.  
 
TABLE D – DIVIDING BETWEEN LOW AND HIGH CONTESTABILITY ELECTIONS 
 
EXPENDITURES REVENUES 
CONTESTABILITY Low High Low High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INCUMBENT  56.286*** 2.039** 13.491*** 2.049*** 
 
(15.387) (2.330) (7.824) (2.791) 
INCUMBENT × FISCAL INDICATOR 1.655*** 1.007 1.135 0.989 
 
(6.131) (0.063) (1.046) (-0.175) 
INCUMBENT × SOCIAL CAPITAL 3.331*** 1.120 1.281 0.986 
 
(5.198) (0.468) (1.080) (-0.080) 
INCUMBENT × FISCAL INDICATOR × SOCIAL CAPITAL 1.254*** 1.009 1.255** 1.051 
 
(4.436) (0.095) (2.098) (1.200) 
EDUCATION 1.232*** 1.129*** 1.174** 1.161*** 
 
(3.503) (4.779) (2.053) (3.075) 
1 = Below High School 
2 = High School Diploma 
3 = College degree and above     
LOG_AGE 0.539*** 0.741*** 0.500*** 0.794** 
 
(-7.094) (-5.288) (-4.510) (-2.030) 
GENDER (MALE = 0) 0.785*** 0.837*** 0.718*** 0.791*** 
 
(-3.312) (-3.191) (-3.344) (-3.822) 
JOB: DEPENDENT LABOR 1.164* 0.955 1.152 0.943 
 
(1.807) (-1.301) (1.168) (-0.588) 
JOB: MANAGER 1.161** 1.004 1.182* 1.001 
 
(2.316) (0.116) (1.706) (0.027) 
JOB: SKILLED LABOR 0.842* 0.931 0.632*** 1.040 
 
(-1.819) (-0.780) (-3.596) (0.263) 
ELECTION FIXED EFFECTS Included Included Included Included 
OBSERVATIONS 15,783 16,472 6,722 7,311 
Notes: We split groups between those elections above and below the median of the contestability measure. Contestability is 
measured as the percentage points difference between the winner and best challenger. Robust z-statistics in parentheses: *** 




Table E. Additional statistics with years’ breakdowns 
 
As rightly suggested by the referee, we also provide information about the total number of elections 
analyzed and the election periods. This is provided in Section 2 footnote 4. Additionally, we have included 
Table E in the Appendix for further details about the statistics about the election periods, total number of 
elections, number of candidates, number of incumbents rerunning for Office, and % of incumbents 
 
 
















2003  474   1,280 211 16.48% 
2004  4,329   10,884 1,508 13.86% 
2005  545   1,444 241 16.69% 
2006  1,258   3,222 774 24.02% 
2007  835   2,393 258 10.78% 
2008  456   1,311 285 21.74% 
2009  4,082   10,421 2,760 26.48% 
2010  633   1,660 372 22.41% 
2011  1,269   3,513 753 21.43% 
2012  839   2,533 478 18.87% 
2013  559   1,664 344 20.67% 
2014  3,895   9,660 2,507 25.95% 





Table F. Substituting the 0-1 dummy if winning or not with the percentage votes obtained by the 
candidate. 
 
TABLE F - OLS – RESULTS. USING PERCENTAGE VOTES (0 TO 100) 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 








































1 = Below High School 
2 = High School Diploma 
3 = College degree and above      



































ELECTION FIXED EFFECTS Included Included 
 
Included Included 
OBSERVATIONS 36,545 36,545 
 
15,675 15,675 
R-SQUARED 0.615 0.615 
 
0.587 0.587 
MATCHING GROUPS 6,984 6,984   6,984 6,984 
        Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
